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Introduction
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the link between portfolio diversification and its implications on the question of systemic risk. We first show that the introduction of any contingent claim, whose value is correlated with the value of the assets owned by a population of heterogeneous agents, causes an improvement of the agents" expected utility. At the same time, such an introduction will increase overall systemic risk. These effects are due to the cumulative interaction of two distinct, but closely related factors:
The gain obtained from diversifying one"s portfolio, thus reducing risk exposure through risk sharing;
(ii) The gain obtained through risk shifting from higher to lower risk-aversion agents.
We test the hypothesis on the negative relationship between diversification and systemic risk follows. In section 1, we review the basic concepts and some of the recent literature on systemic risk. In section 2, we look in particular at the relationship between diversification and systemic risk.
In Section 3, we develop a theoretical model that captures the essence of this relationship, by analyzing the effects on both diversification and systemic risks of the issuance of an additional security. In section 4 we describe the data set. In Section 5 we present the econometric analysis and the results obtained. In the last section we discuss some conclusive remarks.
On the Meaning and the Measure of Systemic Risk
In the context of analysis of financial instability, an active debate has emerged around how to define both a systemic event, a systemic risk, and their effects. Despite the considerable amount of literature on the topic, no shared consensus exists about the meaning, features and policy implications of these concepts. Highlighting the complexity of these issues, Alan Greenspan (1995) , as chair of the Federal Reserve System (FED), has underlined that "the very definition of systemic risk is somewhat unsettled".
Macro-level analyses of systemic risk can be found in several works of the past two decades. Kaufman et al. (2003) refer to systemic risk as the risk or the probability of collapse in an entire financial system. Bartholomew et al. (1995) examine, within the systemic risk spreading mechanism, its effect not only on the domestic economy, but also on the entire international banking, financial, or economic system. Mishkin (1995) focuses on the investment repercussions of such an important event. Allen and Gale (2000) analyze the cause-effect process through which macro-shocks can spark contagion episodes and bank runs. Bordo et al. (1998) define systemic risk as a situation where "shocks to one part of the financial system lead to shocks elsewhere, in turn impinging on the stability of the real economy" (pp. 31). In their exhaustive review of the literature,
De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) offer a similar view of a systemic event, saying that it takes place when a shock affects "a considerable number of financial institutions or markets in a strong sense" (p.11). De Nicolò and Kwast (2002) , and Dow (2000) , define systemic risk as a mechanism that, at the same time of the shock, affects the entire financial system, while Lehar (2005) says that "a systemic crisis can be defined as an event in which a considerable number of financial institutions default simultaneously".
The search of the micro foundations of systemic risk across shock-transmissions and spillover effects on the entire financial system has given rise to a different strand of literature. The following contributions emphasize causation mechanisms requiring close and direct connections among several institutions and different markets. underlines the fact that systemic risk is the probability that cumulative losses originate from an event that, through a contagion effect, involves a chain of institutions belonging to a market. Indicators of interdependencies among financial institutions through the analysis of the financial institution"s assets.
The first group of measures relies on bank capital ratios and bank liabilities to show that aggregate macroeconomic indicators can provide a valid and useful instrument to predict systemic financial threats. Through the study of macroeconomic fundamentals, Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al.
(1997), Gorton (1998) and Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) Lehar (2005) , assessing the probability that a certain number of banks within a specific arc of time go bankrupt due to reduced asset value vis a vis a critical and well-defined liability value. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) The network approach, where the interbank market spreads the transmission of financial stress through the banking system (Allen et al. (2010) );
The co-risk model, (or co-movement risk model) whereby the probability default of one institution is directly linked to the default risk of another institution (Adrian et al. (2009, p .5)), de Vries et al. (2001) , Longin and Solnik (2001) and Chan-Lau (2004) ;
The distress dependence matrix based on the probability of default of banks" pairs, taking into account a panel of financial institutions Goodhart and Segoviano (2009) ;
The default intensity model based on the estimate of the probability of default of financial institutions Giesecke and Bacho (2009)).
Among other contributions that are worth mentioning, Bartram et al. (2005) propose three different approaches to estimate systemic risk by observing market reaction to global financial shocks for a subset of banks that are not directly exposed to the shock 3 . Capuano (2008) develops a framework to derive a market-based measure of probability of default, defined as the probability that the value of the underlying asset will fall below a given threshold. Using a VaR approach, Acharya et al. (2010) , define systemic risk as the likelihood of experiencing cumulative losses in financial system that exceed the predicted by VaR model.
Systemic Risk and Portfolio Diversification
Recalling the 2008 financial crises, characterized by a conglomerate of interrelated financial services and multi-sector institutions, a vibrant discussion has emerged regarding the causes of the recent financial system collapse. In this debate, many financial actors have been analyzing the roots of this phenomenon: on one side, many address as micro-drivers of this turmoil the financialization of the real economy (e.g. mortgage-backed securities (MBS)); others, on the other side, highlight as macro-drivers the lack of an efficient macro-prudential banking system (e.g. timely mechanisms able to prevent contagion and spread). In this current framework, Rodrìgez-Moreno et al. (2010) argue that academic research has widely investigated both idiosyncratic and systematic risk, ignoring the fundamental importance of systemic risk and its implications on the financial markets.
This concept is also clearly expressed in Masera et al. (2010) (Lo, 2008) . In this regard, two different views, outlining both the negative and positive effects of the relationship between diversification and systemic risk, have been characterizing this more controversial strand of the literature. Although portfolio diversification reduces risks at each individual institution, from the prospective of the entire financial system, it only reallocates these individual risks (Wagner, 2009 risks across institutions involved in contributing to make these positions similar to each other, with the effect of facilitating financial contagion due to interlinked relationships among financial institutions. Nevertheless, it is crucial to include in these causes even the large financial conglomerates and the increasing presence of derivative instruments in the international financial system. In particular, derivative products have been indicated as both a responsible mechanism and perverse interaction of risk spreading and transferring from the banking to the insurance sector and vice versa (e.g. Originate-to-Distribute Model in banking and OTC derivatives).
In this regard, risk transfers between insurers and the banking sector represent a widely used diversification instrument, allowing banks to transform liquid liabilities of depositors into illiquid assets (loans) (de Vries 2010). Furthermore, and in particular during the last decade, there are many contributions sustaining the contention that diversification has negative effects on the financial system, including De Young and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2004 Stiroh ( , 2006 , Acharya et al. (2006) , and Hirtle et al. (2007) . In particular, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that benefits stemming from diversification can be completely undermined by the volatility effect of new exposures introduced into a portfolio. Sanya et al. (2010) Allen et al. (2010) claim that the spread of credit default swaps and other credit derivative products, loan sales and collateralized loan obligations, has increased and improved the possibility for banks, mutual funds and financial institutions to diversify risk. But this possibility has, according to Allen et al. (2010) "also led to more overlap and more similarities among their portfolios. This has increased the probability that the failure of one institution is likely to coincide with the failure of other similar institutions" (p.6).
Conversely, there is an opposing strand of the relevant economic literature which sustains the positive effects of diversification, first, from an efficiency gain point of view (Berger et al. (1999) , Estrella (2002) ), and second, in increasing bank stability (Grossman (1994) , Wheelock (1995) , Berger et al. (1999) , Reichart and Wall (2000) , Campa and Kedia (2002) , and Baele et al. (2007) ).
The model
Consider an economy formed by n agents. Each agent is endowed with a certain amount of wealth, whose rate of return varies stochastically from one agent to the other. The satisfaction of the i-th agent is measured by expected utility )
, where E is the expectation operator, Assume now that a derivative is introduced. In our context a derivative is defined as a contingent claim whose value depends on one of the assets, i.e. income sources in the market, more specifically, we will assume it depends on the average return of all other assets. The derivative price ) ( y p is assumed to be distributed with mean Ep , variance 2 p and covariance ip with each agent"s income. The derivative corresponds to a contract between a issuer (i.e. a short holder) and a buyer ( a long holder), whereby each party promises to pay the other a premium in different states of the world.
The i-th agent is confronted with the problem of choosing an optimal number of units of the derivative to hold long (i.e. to purchase) or short (i.e. to issue), so that total income for each agent will be equal in each state of nature to the solution of the following maximization problem:
where i q denotes the number of units of the security in terms of shares of the promised (random)
payoff p , and is positive or negative according to whether the security is bought or sold by the ith agent.
Using (1) and the related assumptions, the expected utility in (2) can be written as follows: 
As shown by Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981) , the indirect utility function in (4) is well behaved, i.e. it is increasing and concave in its arguments.
In order to show that the introduction of the security increases the income of the i-th subject, it is sufficient to show that the problem in (2) has a solution with a non zero value for the security in question. The first order condition is obtained differentiating (3) w.r.t. i q :
where primes indicate derivatives, while the second order condition requires:
which is always satisfied for a concave utility function. Applying the definition of covariance to (6), we obtain:
Differentiating totally with respect to the parameters yields:
which, by applying again the definition of covariance, can be also be written as:
are both positive measures of risk aversion, solving (10) for i dq yields:
Equation (11) establishes the fact that any increase in the expected pay off and/or in the beta will increase long positions while it will reduce short positions in the derivative asset. In a stable market equilibrium, we must have Substituting (12) into (11) yields the equilibrium relationship:
Expression (13) establishes the dependence of the quantities traded of the security on the difference between the individual incentive to diversify (through his beta and risk aversion) and the incentive to shift risk to or from more risk averse traders. Expression (13) can be integrated, assuming that the utility function parameters are constant.
A simpler way to proceed, however, is to expand ' i V in (8) according to the Mac Laurin"s formula:
where the subscripts 0 and denote the fact that the derivatives of the utility function are (16) shows that a solution to the maximization problem is the result of two factors of agents" heterogeneity: (i) the degree of risk aversion and, (ii) the correlation between the security payoff and the agent income. However, in order for the solutions for the different agents to be mutually compatible, the determination of the expected payoff Ep should be competitively determined, i.e. In conclusion, each agent will be able to improve her expected utility by diversifying into a short or long position on an additional contingent claim, depending on two effects: (i) the difference between average and individual demand for diversification (the beta) and, (ii) the difference between average and individual risk aversion. The equilibrium level of long and short positions will be independent from the expected level of the pay off, but will depend only on its variance. For example, in the special case of a derivative that acts as an insurance (e.g. a put option) and pays to Note that the introduction of the security has improved expected income of each agent, it has further diversified her portfolio, but, at the same time, has introduced a new source of variance (and, implicitly, risk), into the system. This new form of risk can be defined as "systemic", because it depends on the correlation between the yield of the derivative and the income of all agents in the system. In other words, a shock on the price of the derivative is transmitted to all agents.
From equation (20), we can derive a modified version of the well known CAPM model, by subtracting from both sides the risk free rate of return r:
Dataset
As noted in section 2, several methodologies have been implemented to measure systemic Table 1 .
The Estimation Strategy and the Empirical Results
We estimate a simultaneous equation model, based on the classical CAPM formulation augmented by a variable that represents the contribution that diversification through derivatives makes to systemic risk. In Tables 2 and 3 , we show the result of the CAPM estimates in the two markets (U.S and Europe). In particular, using the CAPM specification presented in Fama et al.
(2004), we regress individual (fund) excess returns on market returns, the diversification index and a series of dummy variables. In both markets, we find a positive relation between Beta and excess returns. Although the two markets show a significant difference in their Beta coefficients, (approximately 1.16 in the U.S and around 0.86 in the European market) no sizeable variation appears in intra-market differences (the U.S market beta ranges between 1.14 and 1.17 while the European market beta varies between 0.84 and almost 0.89). In the U.S and European market, the diversification variable shows a positive and a high significant coefficient, while the systemic risk variable negatively impacts the excess returns (dependent variable).
Once we examined the CAPM analysis, in order to assess the impact of the diversification strategy on systemic risk, we specify a model in which the market excess returns and the indicators of systemic risk are simultaneously determined and depend on a series of key variables that, according to the literature, play a fundamental role both in influencing the beta market and as a possible factor impacting systemic risk. The model is estimated by using two stage least squares.
The first equation is given by: Equations ( performance, created through the RBSA, and the risk free rate).
As tables 4-5 show, an increase in the correlation of mutual funds" returns (Fcorr) has a negative and significant impact on market excess returns (Mkt_Beta). This effect is strongly significant in both the U.S and EU markets. These findings clearly emerge from the tests applied through the first hypothesis in any specification of the 22a-b models. The Libor (Euribor)-OIS spread represents the unsecured interest rate at which banks lend money to other banks which must satisfy certain criteria for creditworthiness. Libor and Euribor are not entirely credit risk-free, because they reflect both liquidity risk and the bank"s default risk over the following months. The OIS represents the average of the overnight interest rates expected until maturity, so the Libor (Euribor) -OIS reflects both the liquidity and default risks over the next months. Then, during the period where the stock markets register a strong performance, this spread should be subjected to a reduction. In this context, our results confirm the negative relationship between market performance and the Libor (Euribor) -OIS spread indicator. The Cpi and Hicp negative coefficients support the strand of the literature that predicts a negative relationship between inflation and stock performances in the short run.
In the second equation of the simultaneous model, (23a-b) we aim to test the second hypothesis, i.e. that an increase in the similarities of the diversification strategies of each fund can increase the threat of systemic risk. In this case the dependent variable is the systemic risk, while the independent variables are the three dummy variables for 2007-2008-2009 The results of the empirical analysis are contained in table 4 for the U.S market, and table 5 for the European market. In general all these variables show a high level of significance, although the diversification index variable is weakly significant at 10%. The strategy in the asset allocation Beta variable has a negative effect on systemic risk, suggesting that deteriorating market performance reverberates negatively on systemic risk.
Concluding Remarks
The theoretical and empirical motivation of this analysis is the ongoing debate which posits that derivative driven financial diversification, often interpreted by professionals and academics as a fundamental benefit of investment financial strategies, can be undesirable and a driver of excessive instability. Our results provide insight into the connection between portfolio diversification strategies and the impact on systemic risk. In this regard, we have developed a model where the i-th agent diversification strategy interacts with the j-th agent diversification strategy, through the mutual purchase and sale of derivatives, thus increasing agents" interdependence, the probability of contagion from a systemic event and, ultimately, systemic risk. The basic reason for this result is that derivatives provide an insidious instrument of diversification. While they appeal to risk managers because of their capacity, as contingent claims, to provide insurance to individual investors, at the same time, they create a separate source of portfolio volatility which may be increasingly difficult to further diversify.
Some of the implications of the theoretical model have been tested through a simultaneous equations model, where we have hypothesized that systemic risk may increase the need to further diversify and, at the same time, further diversification, by increasing portfolio similarities, can boost systemic risk. Both hypothesis appear to be corroborated by our econometric tests, which show significant and mutual substantial impacts of the signs implied by the model, between diversification and systemic risk variables.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: from the point of view of the individual agent, the portfolio diversification strategy represents a valuable instrument of portfolio management.
However, from the point of view of the financial system, when such a diversification is pursued through a proliferation of derivative securities, the increase in similarities and mutual interdependence among financial agents may result in an increase in aggregate risk. Such an increase has systemic nature since it is based on the loss of a diversified ensemble of financial agents as a key source of systemic resilience. 
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